

HOW TO FAST TRACK EDINBURGH'S TRAMS.

A STUDY OF TRANSPORT PROJECT DELIVERY PROCESSES IN LYON AND EDINBURGH WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE SCOTTISH SYSTEM.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Transport projects in France are delivered more speedily than in Scotland. When comparing project delivery in each country this statement applies to the vast majority of infrastructure projects undertaken. This includes implementation of relatively small scale measures to improve the existing transport network or service through to construction and delivery of major public transport schemes. This paper assesses the contention that elongated processes for approval and poor project management in Scotland generates negative publicity which leads to public disillusionment, which in turn creates a further barrier for effective delivery of major transport schemes.

Research for the original paper was presented as the dissertation for MSc Transport Planning and Engineering at Napier University, Edinburgh. It assessed the procedures of transport delivery in Scotland and France using case studies of the tramways in Edinburgh and Lyon. The aim was to determine which aspects of the French system facilitate quicker project delivery without detracting from the validity of the process by, for example, compromising the rigour of decision-making or consultation.

After briefly providing the context to each case study, this summary paper will focus on the key findings from the research and on identifying where differences between Scotland and France have been shown. This will provide some grounding from which to outline the recommendations for improving the speed and efficiency of transport project delivery in Scotland.

During a time of change for the organisational structure of Scottish transport policy under the Transport (Scotland) Act 2005, the research aimed to specifically assess the roles of various organisations in project delivery in Scotland and France. A key objective was to develop an understanding of how the relationship between local, regional and national level bodies contributed to, or detracted from, the effective delivery of transport projects. The opinions of local politicians and key personnel at SYTRAL, the transport authority for Lyon, were vital in illuminating the impacts of the French political hierarchy on transport project delivery.

Following on from analysis of the 'French experience' a set of recommendations or opinions as to how the re-organisation of responsibilities for transport policy in Scotland can best be utilised to improve transport project delivery will be outlined.

2. RESEARCH METHODS AND STRUCTURE

2.1 Research overview

The research period was divided between Lyon and Edinburgh. Initial background research along with some preliminary interviews was conducted in Edinburgh in May and June 2005. This was followed by a 7 week research placement in Lyon during June and July 2005 which was carried out in collaboration with Ecole Nationale des Travaux publics de l'Etat in Vaulx-en-Velin, Lyon. Completion of research and analysis of findings was conducted in Edinburgh in August and September 2005.

The way in which transport policy structures are perceived and understood is based on personal opinions and political outlook. Thus a high proportion of the research for this paper, which sought to identify and analyse differences in transport policy structures, was based on understanding the structures' political context, how this relates to the performance and efficiency of the structure, and how these aspects are perceived by stakeholders of transport policy at various levels. With this in mind, research was undertaken using a social science outlook primarily focussing on qualitative methods.

The main primary research method was in-depth interviews with transport professionals focussing on their experiences and opinions of the project delivery process. Interviews with representatives of the following organisations were conducted:

- Scotland
 - City of Edinburgh Council
 - Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (TIE) Limited
 - The Scottish Executive
 - South East Scotland Transport Partnership (SESTRAN)
 - The University of Glasgow

- France
 - Syndicat Mixte des Transports pour le Rhône et l'Agglomération Lyonnaise (SYTRAL)
 - Grand Lyon Council (GLC)
 - Semaly Transport Consultancy
 - Ecole Nationale des Travaux publics de l'Etat (ENTPE)

Although, at some point in all interviews, the interviewees sought to give 'neutral' or factual responses, even in these instances it was necessary to recognise these statements not to be completely objective. Rather than the subjective nature of interview responses detracting from the validity of the findings, through acknowledgement of this aspect of the research, responses have been used to build an interesting comparative analysis of perceptions of transport policy in France and Scotland.

Through collaboration with ENTPE it was possible to secure a number of interviews with 'high profile' figures connected with transport in Lyon. Research in Lyon involved discussing;

- The role of SYTRAL, the public transport authority for the Greater Lyon area, with the Director General, Gilles Godard.
- The local political climate with Fawzi Benarbia, an elected Councillor on the GLC for Villeurbanne who has since been invited on to the board of SYTRAL.
- The experiences of designing and building the tramway with Vincent Gascon, a Senior Consultant at Semaly, the largest and most influential transport consultancy in Lyon.
- The organisational structure of transport project delivery in France with Olivier Laurent, a Senior Official in the GLC.

200 questionnaires were carried out to draw comparisons between public opinion towards consultation in each city and enable examination of differences in how the public perceive their role in the project delivery process. The sample was broken down as follows;

- Lyon (50 people approached while waiting for/using public transport)
- Lyon (50 people approached in the street not currently using public transport)
- Edinburgh (50 people approached while waiting for/using public transport)
- Edinburgh (50 people approached in the street not currently using public transport)

Furthermore a focus group was conducted in Lyon which entailed discussion of local politics and group members' opinions on how this impacts upon the transport system.

2.2 Research process

In approaching the research questions the work programme comprised the following steps;

1. Literature search to determine background of the transport project delivery processes in Scotland and France and what appear to be the main differences between the two.
2. Formulation of a hypothesis; effectively a list of anticipated differences between the two systems which appear to contribute to why the process of delivery is quicker in France.
3. Research in Edinburgh and Lyon: In-depth interviews with policy and political figures, public questionnaire conducted with those using public transport and on streets away from public transport.
4. Analysis of findings and testing of the hypothesis; determination of extent to which each factor contributed to differences in project delivery

- timescale, and identification of linkages between findings and instances in which they amalgamate to produce a series of key differences.
5. Critical assessment of each system and the differences between them.
 6. Recommendations for improvements to transport project delivery in Scotland.
 7. Drawing of conclusions.

2.3 Hypothesis

Initial research identified the following 12 potential reasons for differences in project delivery timescales. This formed the structure for presentation of the findings in the original paper, a summary of which is outlined in section 4.

	Aspect of project delivery process	Hypothesis / contention
1	Public consultation	There is less public consultation and overall public involvement in the planning and implementation of transport schemes in France than in the UK; a key focus of the questionnaire was to determine how the public view their role in this process, and if the views or 'culture' are different in each location.
2	Project appraisal	There is either less appraisal of schemes in France prior to decision making and implementation, or the appraisal process is more efficient and streamlined in France than the UK.
3	Politicised nature of transport	It has previously been claimed that transport in the UK is a more politicised issue than on the continent. ² If this is the case then presumably decisions for and implementation of transport schemes is a less politically sensitive issue in France than the UK, inferring that it is smoother process, less prone to delays.
4	Parliamentary approval	Gaining statutory approval for transport projects in France is more straightforward and does not involve the long-winded Parliamentary process required in Scotland. The stages in the processes that various levels of approval are required, the order the process takes and the level of detail involved may also be different.
5	Funding	There is a higher level of funding for transport schemes in France and the level of funding is more reliable than the UK. This enables more effective planning and less delays during implementation.

6	Accountability of decision makers	The 'dirigiste' attitude/culture in France means that transport authorities have more power to simply implement projects without adhering to strict practices to ensure accountability for and transparency of the decision making process. Decisions are often made out with the public eye with decision makers being less publicly accountable.
7	Political 'champions'	The nature of local politics in France with elected city Mayors with considerable statutory powers is different to all areas of the UK apart from London. The evidence of strong public and political figures 'championing' transport schemes means that implementation of the schemes is a more efficient process conducted with a lot more urgency than in the UK.
8	Local/regional autonomy	The statutory organisation of the levels of government is different in France to the UK, and the structure there affords a greater level of autonomy and decision making power to regional and local authorities. At the time research commenced the regional authorities in Scotland had no statutory power. The French system removes the need to constantly seek approval from national government at various stages of the project, enabling a more streamlined implementation process.
9	Number of organisations involved in project delivery	The make up of management structures for transport projects is more centralised, more unified and less complex in France than in the UK and fewer organisations are involved in the planning and implementation of transport projects. This reduces the level of communication required and the number of working relationships to be upheld meaning there are less delays and less time is needed for administration.
10	Civil Service culture in the UK	The culture and level of efficiency in the UK civil service has come under criticism in the past, as has the relationship between the Scottish Executive and the 32 unitary authorities. The role of the Scottish Executive as the main funding body behind transport schemes means that transport project promoters effectively rely on an organisation which has been seriously brought in to question. Research aimed to investigate to what extent this creates a barrier to implementation today.

11	Culture of competition between cities in France	It was initially understood that traditionally a strong culture of competition between cities exists in France. It was envisaged that has created a greater tendency for unification within the councils and authorities of each city for the 'common good' of that city regarding allocation of funding from the French State, for example. In the event of this culture, greater co-operation at council level would result in fewer delays in the implementation of transport schemes. Research aimed to investigate to what extent this is evident in France and whether local authority staff have found that it enhances the efficiency of transport project delivery.
12	Compulsory purchase powers	In connection with the 'dirigiste' culture outlined in hypothesis vi, it was understood that local authorities in France are supported by more stringent laws on compulsory purchase of land. The statutory process of considering objections and the administration connected with compulsory purchase can cause considerable delay for project implementation, it was assumed that in a more powerful statutory environment in France these delays are minimised.

3. BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDIES

3.1 Edinburgh

Edinburgh is the second largest city in Scotland after Glasgow with a population of 448,624.³ The city centre and transport hub focuses on Princes Street which the vast majority of city and national buses pass through. The major railway station, Edinburgh Waverly, is also located close by.

As Scotland's capital and administrative centre, Edinburgh plays host to the Scottish Parliament and the headquarters of the Scottish Executive, as well as the national rugby stadium and 4 major universities. The city has also twice hosted the Commonwealth games. As a result provision of efficient transport links are fundamental to the effective functioning of the city meaning there has been long standing pressure to improve the city's transport network.


The remit for planning and maintaining the day to day running of Edinburgh's transport network rests with the transport department City of Edinburgh Council (CEC). During the delivery of major projects the CEC work closely with Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (TIE) Ltd, an 'arms length' company set up in May 2002 to deliver major transport projects in the city within the next 10

to 15 years ⁴ which is wholly owned by the Council. TIE Ltd provide procurement services as well as project and finance management to CEC with the aim of ensuring major transport projects are delivered effectively.

As the city has no underground or light rail system Edinburgh's public transport system is completely dependent upon buses, a concept which seemed strange to transport professionals interviewed in Lyon. The Transport Act (1985) deregulated local buses outside London and Northern Ireland. As a result on-road competition exists in Edinburgh primarily between local operator Lothian Buses and national transport provider Firstgroup.

Despite the aims of producing a higher degree of efficiency and performance in the transport sector by introducing competition through privatisation, satisfaction with public transport in Edinburgh is extremely low compared to the non-competitive environment of public transport provision in Lyon. Figure 3.1 shows that the average level of satisfaction across all categories in Lyon was 4.46 (satisfied-extremely satisfied) compared to 2.97 in Edinburgh (neutral-unsatisfied). Despite the introduction of significant bus priority measures within CEC's 'Greenways' initiative ⁵ congestion continues to significantly impact upon the reliability of bus services in the city. The public rated the level of service in Edinburgh particularly poorly in the 'reliability', 'convenience' and 'punctuality' categories which are all fundamental for provision of an effective public transport service.

Figure A: Levels of satisfaction with public transport in Edinburgh and Lyon



Questionnaire results also showed that the level of awareness of organisations responsible for public transport provision in Edinburgh was considerably lower than in Lyon, which is indicative of either comparatively poor publicity by CEC and TIE Ltd or lower public interest levels.

The heavy reliance on buses was exposed by the Lothian Bus drivers' industrial action in July and August 2005.⁶ This, combined with the low satisfaction of public transport in Edinburgh (see Figure A), has resulted in considerable pressure to improve the public transport system.

Proposals for re-introduction of tramways in Edinburgh to alleviate problems of dependence on buses have been tabled for a number of years. Until the relatively recent creation of TIE Ltd these had not been developed to the stage of implementation.

The delivery of a tram system in Edinburgh is effectively a joint project between TIE Ltd, CEC and the Scottish Executive, with SESTRAN also being kept informed of progress. Transport Edinburgh Limited (TEL) are also involved with the specific remit of ensuring there is an integrated ticket system between trams and buses. TIE Ltd have appointed the contract of operating the tram network to French company Transdev.⁷ The company also operate trams in Nottingham as well as Grenoble, Montpellier, Nantes, Strasbourg, Toulouse and Valenciennes.

The initial proposal was for 3 lines however plans for Tramline 3, which was designed to provide a link between central Edinburgh and the South East of the city including the Royal Infirmary hospital, were shelved by City of Edinburgh Council because this part of the network was to be funded by congestion charging, which was rejected by the people of Edinburgh in a referendum in February 2005. Plans for Tramline 2 have also more recently been thrown in to doubt through a proposed 'staggered funding policy' which will initially aim to deliver Tramline 1. The proposed route of Tramline 1 is outlined in Figure B below. The current anticipated completion date for the tramway is 2010, under this timescale the project will have taken between 9 and 10 years from inception to completion.

Figure B: Proposed route of Edinburgh Tramline 1



Fundamentally it is suggested that simple delivery of a tramway system will not alone guarantee improvement of public transport service across Edinburgh. Full integration with all existing modes of transport, as observed in Lyon (see Section 3.2) is also required, which, as will be shown, represents a considerable challenge in the face of the current public transport framework and policy structure in Scotland.

Despite receiving considerable support, the implementation of tramways in Edinburgh has also met with a wide array of objections ranging from environmental concerns⁸ to objections tabled by large organisations centring around safety and the technical implications of the project,⁹ some of which have been rectified.

3.2 Lyon

The Lyon metropolitan area is the second largest agglomeration in France, after Paris, with an estimated population of 1,648,216 and approximate area of 600 Sq Km.¹⁰ Lyon is the third largest discrete city in France, after Paris and Marseille, with an estimated population of 468,300 in 2004.¹¹ The traditional or 'old' city centre focused around Place Bellecour in the centre of the peninsula between the rivers Saône and Rhône. The traditional central transport hub was at near-by Perrache which forms the origin of métro (underground) line A and housed the city's main regional and national railway station.

Resulting from the recent economic development in Lyon, the business and administrative centre has since moved to Part Dieu which now houses the city's main railway station and bus links to the airport as well as access to métro line B. Since implementation of the tramways Perrache and Part Dieu are now directly linked by line 1.

The Greater Lyon area is divided in to 55 municipalities, of which the city of Lyon (which itself is divided in to 9 'arrondissements')¹² is one. Municipalities are represented by elected members on the Grand Lyon Council (GLC), the population of each municipality determines how many representatives it has on the GLC. Grand Lyon falls within the jurisdiction of the Département du Rhône, which, in turn, is contained within Région Rhône Alps which is the level of governance directly below the French State.

The Grand Lyon area is serviced by the second largest public transport network in France. Approximately 1.3 million trips are made on public transport daily in Lyon, around half of these by métro.¹³

During the first half of the 20th century transport in Lyon was dominated by tramways and trolley buses. It has been reported that carrying a high volume of passengers without adequate maintenance during WWII resulted in degradation of the tramways. Robert (1994) outlined how, in the aftermath of WWII, the public authorities seemed to favour private transport, as a result financially constrained operating companies replaced the run down tram system with cheap, mass produced busses.

Subsequently the 1973 construction of the métro system in Lyon revolutionised public transport in the city by relieving pressure on the out-dated bus service. Today the focus is on tramway implementation to complement the métro system while also reclaiming surface space from the car.

The GLC have transferred all responsibility for operating and developing public transport to Syndicat Mixte des Transports pour le Rhône et l'Agglomération Lyonnaise (SYTRAL) which is the public transit authority for the Greater Lyon metropolitan area owned jointly by the GLC and the Département du Rhône. SYTRAL is responsible for all public transport except heavy rail which is controlled by the State. The fact that all modes of public

transport are under the remit of a publicly owned company eliminates problems of inter modal competition, as well as simplifying the planning and implementation of multi modal integration.

SYTRAL has appointed one private company to take responsibility for operation of the public transport network, this eliminates problems of on-road competition between operators, and also contributes to simplification of integration and service co-ordination. The operating company in Lyon is Keolis who own the Transports en Commun Lyonnais (TCL), the transport service brand specifically designed for the city. As well as tramways, operation of the métro and bus system is conducted from the same source. Rolling stock is owned and fares are set by SYTRAL who also contribute to co-ordination of the integrated ticketing system and monitor the performance of TCL.

The public transport network in Lyon comprises the following modes;

- Bus (electric as well as diesel powered) with extensive bus priority measures; contra-flow as well as with-flow lanes (130 routes).
- Trolley bus (electric powered) (6 lines).
- Métro (including a driverless section; line D) (4 lines).
- Electric Tram (2 lines; 18km of track, 39 stations, 7 of these connected to métro)
- Heavy rail (TGV as well as regular trains)
- Funicular railway (2 lines)
- Common cycle scheme (extensive on road and segregated cycle path network)

SYTRAL's aim is to secure the most efficient transport system possible though full integration.¹⁴ Through its extensive remit, SYTRAL are able to ensure that design of additional schemes such as the tramways reflects this ethos. Tram ticketing is fully integrated with all other modes and the real time information network for bus and métro has been altered to enable schedule integration with the tramways. There are integrated interchanges between modes at several key centres across the city (Part Dieu, Charpennes, Laurent Bonneville, Perrache, Bellecour and Grange Blanche) as well as a number of park and ride sites.

Development of tramlines 1 and 2 is part of a long term plan proposing the development of 12 lines in total. The decision to build the first 2 tramlines was taken in 1997; they were opened in January 2001. Construction took place under the leadership of Mayor Raymond Barre who was also president of Greater Lyon Council between 1995 and 2001 and Christian Philip who was the vice president of GLC in charge of Transport for the same period, together they formed a strong political partnership during delivery of the scheme.

4. FINDINGS

This section will present a summary of the key findings in relation to the hypothesis outlined in section 2.3.

4.1 Public consultation

Clear cultural differences regarding the level of public involvement and the expectancy from the public to be involved were identified between France and Scotland. While Chapter 11 of STAG ¹⁵ sets out extensive guidance on the Scottish consultation requirements, reduced time spent on periods of consultation in France clearly shortens the overall timescale for project delivery.

From the case study in Lyon it was apparent that the legislative structure in France does not place as much importance upon acknowledging or dealing with objections to or enquiries on transport schemes, and does not afford the public as prominent a role in the decision making process; Giles Godard of SYTRAL remarked *“the public’s job is not to do the work of the professionals”*. As a result the lower likelihood of objections being made reduces the number and duration of delays experienced. Interviews also uncovered how consultation is undertaken much later in the planning process in France; Olivier Laurent observed that *“basically it’s more of a public validation than a public debate It’s more information than consultation”*.

Although the style of consultation in France is not conducive to extensive public involvement, this has not met with a large degree of public criticism due to the high level of success public transport projects have traditionally delivered.¹⁶

Regarding criticisms around the possible reduction in transparency this could entail results from the questionnaire suggested that, despite being less involved than in Scotland, the public in France feel they are involved enough in transport decision making and have more faith that if they did wish to input to the system their point would be considered.

4.2 Project appraisal

Research found that the level of detail of project appraisal is less extensive in France and that it is carried out later in the project planning process. This greatly reduces the time required to plan and implement transport projects. Furthermore there is less delay between appraisal and project delivery which reduces delays and eliminates the need for repeat exercises which have been required in the UK where delays have been extensive

In discussion with a transport academic in Scotland who has understanding of both systems it was suggested that the appraisal process is considerably more streamlined in France because of either conscious or subconscious

acknowledgement that the ultimate decision boils down to a political judgement call. While the interviewee was of the opinion that ultimately this is also the case in the UK, it was suggested that there is an inherent refusal to acknowledge this within the planning process due to the desire of its policy and decision makers appear transparent and accountable. As will be outlined in section 4.6 this desire is not as prevalent in France.

As a result the French system places less emphasis on the need to quantifiably justify the choice schemes; leading one interviewee to comment *“in France they just don’t worry about the technical accuracy [of appraisal] as much as we do here because they don’t have the rich, complex layers of processes that we do here [in Scotland]”*.

4.3 Politicised nature of transport

In contrast to the expectation in hypothesis 3, research showed that politics plays a significant role in ensuring reduced project delivery timescales in France. Differing political outlooks manifest themselves in subtly different ways in the transport spheres of France and Scotland. Experiences in Scotland have shown how ‘party politics’ has traditionally resulted in differing outlooks on transport policy, where as in Lyon there is a history of more frequent political consensus on local transport issues, created partly from a tension between local jurisdictions and the State, almost resulting in local councillors of all political outlooks ‘uniting’ against the State.¹⁷

The prominent role of ‘party politics’ in local transport in Scotland has been shown to be of detriment to the fast delivery of schemes, particularly in Councils with a small minority, an issue which is not as prominent in France. The combination of more frequent political consensus and the higher level of autonomy afforded to local authorities in France means that, as well as decisions being made more quickly, local control over funding means that implementation also faces less delays.

4.4 Parliamentary approval

Results from the research suggest that the requirement for schemes such as the Edinburgh tramway to gain approval through the Parliamentary process creates a considerable delay to project delivery in Scotland. Interviews with officials at local authority level identified a perception of a lot of ‘red tape’ being involved in the process of transport project planning and delivery.

A system involving a substantially higher degree of local autonomy in decision making means that this is not the case in France.

Furthermore Parliamentary approval for transport projects in Scotland does not entail funding allocation; this is granted by the Scottish Executive in a separate process which creates further delays.

4.5 Funding

Figures within local authorities in Scotland occupy considerably more uncertain roles than those of French Mayors when promoting tram systems. The reduced level of funding in Scotland often means that schemes are required to cover costs through revenue generation, which is often not the case in France. Furthermore the requirement to do this is in a far more 'risky' situation of free market competition which is not the case in French cities. This, combined with the comparatively stringent and extensive process of gaining approval and funding for schemes in Scotland based on the rigorous appraisal programme, means that initial justification as well as eventual operation of transport schemes is a far more time consuming, expensive and uncertain process in Scotland than in France.

The project finance system in France is based on generation of substantial funds for transport projects from the local transport tax – the 'versement transport' - means there is less reliance upon central government for funding which enables more effective planning, less delays and ultimately shorter delivery timescales. In contrast interviews with those involved in the promotion of tramways in Edinburgh revealed problems for local and regional authorities resulting from the centralised funding system in Scotland which means they can not plan effectively because they do not have information regarding the level of finance they will be allocated in advance.

4.6 Accountability of decision makers

Research in Lyon identified the prominent role of a 'dirigiste' culture, where decisions in economic and social spheres are controlled by the State, in transport decision making in France. This culture results in a system with considerably less public consultation than in Scotland which reduces the time taken to plan transport projects.

This culture results in an almost automatic acceptance of state decisions and is further magnified by the generally higher degree of consensus regarding transport schemes within French local government which was identified in section 4.3. Research identified how it is thought that this culture has a direct impact on implementation of projects with once transport academic finding; *"once a decision is made every arm of the French state exists to carry it out; if government decides something is going to happen, then it happens"*.

It has been clearly identified how the culture in France involves far lower levels of accountability and transparency in comparison with Scotland. Institutionalised legislative barriers to implementation such as the mandatory 60 day objection period for minor alternations to a proposed route, which cause considerable delay in Scotland, are simply not involved in the process of delivery in France.

4.7 Political ‘champions’

The tradition of ‘leadership politics’ contributes considerably to the successful delivery of transport projects in France. The culture of strong political figures staking their reputation and credibility on the efficient delivery of transport projects undoubtedly adds considerable direction. In the case of Lyon the ‘champion’ of the tramways was Raymond Barre (Mayor of the Grand Lyon Council and President of the Urban Community of Lyon 1995 – 2001) who was a former Prime Minister of France (1976-81).

The absence of strong political leadership of transport schemes or ‘championing’ by a prominent public figure in Scotland was cited as a fundamental contribution to increased timescales of delivery; one local authority figure suggested “*there is no real focus on progress or urgency [in Scotland] because you don’t have this elected Mayor banging the table and saying ‘we’ve got 4 and a half years to go mate, lets get on with it’*”.

Fundamentally it is the presence of strong political figures *combined with* the 6 year electoral cycle which is long enough to enable delivery of transport projects such as the Lyon tramways, which imports a further level of urgency in to the delivery process in France. The outcome of several of the interviews in Scotland was to find this combination to be the most fundamental reason for differing timescales between Scotland and France. The level of leadership and urgency resulting from the high level of personal and political interest of a strong figure can not be recreated when ownership of transport project development is shared between a number of different organisations.

4.8 Local/regional autonomy

As shown in Figure C the French system of governance involves more tiers than in the UK. However rather than the additional level adding to delays and complicating the process of delivery, research showed that because the distribution of remits and responsibilities is clear, the high level of autonomy granted to local authorities means reporting to the upper levels is kept to a minimum.

The process is actually more streamlined and efficient than in Scotland. One interviewee in Scotland found the advantages of this system to be; “*you have got a clearer vision; the huge incentive of the system is that regions in France can raise a lot more of their funds than authorities can here*”.

Figure C: Relevant ‘tiers of governance’ for Lyon and Edinburgh

	Lyon (number of bodies at each tier)	Edinburgh (number of bodies at each tier)
National	The French State Government (1)	The Scottish Executive (1)
Regional	Région Rhône Alps (22)	SESTRAN (7)
Department	Département du Rhône (92)	
Local	Grand Lyon Council (over 36,000)	City of Edinburgh Council (32)

While analysis of French planning and policy structures found that the system was highly effective in delivering transport projects at local authority level, problems of co-ordination between regional and local authorities were identified in projects conducted across local boundaries.

Olivier Laurent of the GLC described how, once projects go beyond the ‘city wide’ level, although the identification of remits is more clear, problems can still be caused by poor communication or coordination between bodies; *“SYTRAL is not allowed to work outside its own perimeter”*. As a result a forthcoming light rail project between the City of Lyon and Aéroport Lyon-Saint Exupéry to the South East will be a Département du Rhône rather than a SYTRAL project. SYTRAL had already planned a tramway through the city in that direction, this means there will be 2 tramways running almost parallel to each other with the same technology, but the SYTRAL project will terminate on the edge of the GLC area while the Département du Rhône project will continue to the airport (Chlastacz, 2005). The lack of coordination between levels of governance on this project has led to frustration by officials at the GLC; *“it’s a good example of the limits of French administration 2 tramways, the same technology but 2 different people in charge so it’s a bit complicated”*.

4.9 Number of organisations involved in project delivery

Research has shown that, despite predictions in hypothesis 6 that less organisations are involved in implementation in France which enables faster project delivery, the project management structure actually appears to be more complex to that in Scotland.

The fundamental difference is in the way in which this structure is organised and the allocation of responsibilities within it. In the delivery of major transport schemes in France there is a history of awarding a main contract to one large

company which then takes responsibility for construction and implementation, through supervising sub-contractors and reporting back to the local authority.

The utilisation of one major company in the case of the Lyon tramways (Semaly) to provide transport consultancy, engineering and project management expertise removed the need for the local authority to work with a large number of contractors. This reduces the delay and administration cost caused by the local authority being in contact with a large number of private companies. Greater efficiency appears to be achieved in France through importing the private sector profit motive in to the project management structure.

Within the complex project management structure of the Edinburgh tramways project which involves a large number of both public and private organisations, tensions were identified in a number of working relationships which inevitably reduce the efficiency of project delivery.

The fact that one State contracted operating company (Keolis in the form of TCL) is responsible for all modes of public transport in Lyon greatly reduced the timescale for implementation of the tramways. It meant that interchange, ticket and schedule integration of transport systems was a far less complicated and time consuming process.

In contrast the deregulated public transport market in Scotland increases the level of risk in development of a transport project. As well as the difficulties caused in liaising with private companies on integration, the risk of competition within or across transport modes in Scotland further complicates the implementation process. Transport schemes led by local authorities have neither any way of predicting nor controlling the level of competition the scheme will face from private operators. This greatly undermines the certainty of the appraisal exercise which underpins the application for funding, this in turn generates more demand for appraisal, further adding to the delay, one key figure associated with the promotion of the Edinburgh tramways found *“this brings incredible nervousness and therefore endless rigour to attempt to get to the bottom of it which wouldn’t be the case on continental Europe”*.

4.10 Civil Service culture in the UK

The involvement of the civil service in Scottish transport projects was criticised. Although it was identified that the efficiency of the Scottish Executive has improved over recent years, the research found that the perception of this organisation by others involved in the delivery of Edinburgh’s tramways is poor. The following opinions were all expressed by interviewees with key involvement in delivery of tramways in Edinburgh;

- On the funding proposals for the new regional bodies; *“the lack of clarity in terms of what is being proposed by the [Scottish] Executive is quite worrying at this stage.”*

- On the structure that the new RTP's will take; *“not surprisingly the [Scottish] Executive are not too forth coming with the details.”*
- On organisational remits for future transport projects; *“we have asked the Scottish Executive for a definition of what is a local/regional/national project in the future but, as usual, they keep ducking away from the issue.”*

Furthermore the level of control over project delivery the Scottish Executive has as a result of its financial input was a cause of some displeasure for one interviewee; *“to be honest the [Scottish] Executive can thwart the wishes of [the Scottish] Parliament [for a scheme] by simply not finding the money for it”*, the same interviewee also added; *“no matter who you are the Scottish Executive can always find another set of questions to ask you”*.

This section has shown that a poor perception of the Scottish Executive remains in other bodies involved in the implementation of tramways in Edinburgh. This appears to have had a negative impact upon working relationships which has led to considerable delays in the planning process.

4.11 Culture of competition between cities in France

Research confirmed the suggestion in hypothesis 11 that a traditional culture of inter-city competition exists in France. The Director General of SYTRAL suggested that this culture has meant that cities have been in competition for public funding and resources from the State as well as for private investment. Provision of an efficient, modern public transport system has long been seen in France as a prerequisite for making a city attractive to private investment (Baillly and Stathopoulos, 2000). Residents of Lyon who took part in the focus group showed a high level of pride in the transport system, which they saw as a major asset to the city.

The culture of competition between cities in France has been extended to the next level in Lyon by ambitious political leaders keen to raise the profile beyond France to a European level. They see Lyon as one of the top 15 cities in Europe – competing directly with cities such as Barcelona, Rome, Paris, Madrid and Berlin. This undoubtedly had an effect on ensuring the fast and efficient implementation of a transport system seen to portray a modern and vibrant image for the city.

4.12 Compulsory purchase powers

Research revealed that compulsory purchase of land was not a major issue in either scheme. In Lyon the tramways were implemented on existing transport routes and/or in areas of urban degradation which meant that there were no major issues surrounding acquisition of land for the tramways.

For the proposed tramways in Edinburgh the only building which will require to be compulsorily purchased is the Caledonian Alehouse in Gorgie.

Requirements for land are included in the overall proposal to Parliament meaning powers for compulsory purchase are granted when a project receives Royal Assent.

Interviewees in both Lyon and Edinburgh did not consider this aspect to have an important impact on the tramway developments in each city; therefore it was not pursued as a major strand of research as part of these particular case studies.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT TO TRANSPORT PROJECT DELIVERY IN SCOTLAND

Successful delivery of tramways in Lyon was more a result of strong leadership and local autonomy than guidance from national level policy. It is therefore contended that the creation of a National Transport Agency and subsequent delivery of an NTS does not necessarily guarantee improvement to the local project delivery process in Scotland. The emphasis on local strategies fitting with national objectives, it is suggested, reduces the effectiveness of local planning, and ultimately project delivery.

It is suggested that the traditional hierarchical structure supporting 'top down' policy making in Scotland acts as a constraint to effective transport project delivery. At present re-organisation is focussing on developing national level strategies to pass on guidance to regional and local levels. It is argued that resources should instead be utilised to improve planning at the local level which can then inform more relevant national policy making. A conceptual shift from 'top down' to 'bottom up' transport planning, where regional and national objectives fit with the needs identified by local authorities, is called for.

It is proposed that strong local planning would lay the foundation for a structure of effective regional planning, both of which should inform planning at the national level. A key feature of this structure would be the Scottish Executive efficiently and effectively engaging with local authorities to improve local planning. Under a 'bottom up' system of planning LTS's would act as the building blocks for the new statutory RTS's.

Under this system it would be fundamental that local planning is effective, otherwise weaknesses that occur at the local level would be carried on through the system and inherited at national policy level. Possibly this reason has ensured that previous national policy has prescribed a 'top down' approach; on the surface making improvements to the performance of 1 organisation (the Scottish Executive) or developing the remits of 7 organisations (the RTP's) appear to be far less daunting tasks than improving the performance of 32 individual local authorities. However for real improvements in project delivery it is suggested that this arduous task is essential.

The level of autonomy afforded to the local authority for Lyon resulted in effective delivery of the tramways as a project contained within the GLC jurisdiction. However it was also identified how there are considerable limitations to the French system of regional project delivery resulting from lack of co-ordination with local planning. It is essential that the remits of all layers of governance in Scotland are clearly defined. It is suggested that this task is tackled by joint committees comprising representatives from local authorities, RTP's and the Scottish Executive. This will enable clarification of exactly which responsibilities rest with which organisation. This should be clearly and effectively communicated to all stakeholders. The aim is to develop a structure of working relationships meaning that situations such as the clash between regional and local planning in Lyon would be avoided in Scotland.

It is suggested that, in the long term, statutory adjustments to link approval for and funding of transport projects should be made. The potential delay between a proposal receiving Royal Assent from Parliament and funding from the Scottish Executive is a major barrier to implementation. If Royal Assent was granted in the knowledge that adequate funding was available and included entitlement to immediate funding, these delays would be avoided.

This would require a considerable overhaul of the transport project finance system in Scotland. A less radical suggestion is that the current system of LTS's acting as unofficial applications for funding to the Scottish Executive be abolished along with the requirement for local policies to fit with those at national level. This would result in more innovative local planning which is not developed around what the local authority believes the Scottish Executive wants to hear. As a result LTS's would form stronger, more efficient documents informing planners at all levels of the real needs of local transport, thus aiding more efficient and streamlined implementation of the projects they propose.

Analysis of the project management structure for the Lyon tramways showed that the effectiveness of delivery is increased by freeing the local authority of the task of managing and co-ordinating the full range of contractors involved in implementation. The case study showed how the process in Lyon was successful through allocating this role to Semaly. As a private consultancy and engineering company the urgency that Semaly's management role imports in to this aspect of project delivery was highlighted as a major benefit of the system in Lyon.

Therefore a move away from awarding specific contracts for particular aspects of transport project assessment or implementation, towards tendering for more wide-ranging aspects of project delivery in Scotland is also recommended. It is suggested that inviting tender from private transport engineering/consultancy companies for more substantial aspects of project delivery would entice market leaders.

The aim would be to create adequate conditions for companies currently operating as transport/engineering consultancies to diversify and expand, ultimately re-positioning themselves to fulfil a management and co-ordination

role within the project delivery process. Meanwhile the tendering process and competition from similar companies would ensure performance levels continue to improve. This would mean that local authorities would no longer have to deal with the multitude of consultancies contracted to carry out fairly minor aspects of projects. The considerable administration required by the associated need for communication would also be reduced. This would enable local authority expertise to be concentrated on more strategic aspects of project delivery.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to provide a balanced critique of each system. Although there were a higher number of positive aspects (in terms of speed of project delivery) identified in the Lyon case study, it has been shown that the French system does not represent the ideal model. The fact that consultation with and involvement of the public has traditionally been less evident in the 'dirigiste' method of planning undoubtedly contributes to faster project delivery. Certain aspects of the French system, including the reduced role of consultation, it has been suggested, would not be applicable in Scotland. This is due to differences between the cultural and political contexts as well as more basic differences in geographical area and population.

Rather than seeking to make recommendations as to how the system in Scotland can be made *quicker*, the research focussed on how the system can be made *better*. Naturally this would entail an improvement in the *speed* of project delivery, but the key aim has been to make suggestions of how to do this while maintaining the *quality* of delivery.

It was concluded that further allocation of resources to local planning should be a priority for improvements to transport project delivery in Scotland from the 'bottom up', rather than attempts to improve the structure by 'top down' policy making. It was suggested that increasing the effectiveness of local planning, and the extent to which this is incorporated by all other levels of planning, is the only possible way that transport project delivery in Scotland can be guided by a truly effective national strategy.

7. NOTES

1. Full information on this research institute and academic institution is available at: <http://www.entpe.fr>
2. Wistrich (1983) found that transport has long been a politicised issue in the UK which has not been the case in most other European countries. While government and opposition in the UK have been seen to be playing 'political football' with transport policy within and across governmental cycles, outlooks on approaches to transport policy in Europe have been subject to a greater degree of political consensus.
3. Edinburgh's Census 2001; <http://www.edinburgh.gov.uk/>
4. See <http://www.tie.ltd.uk/>
5. See <http://www.edinburgh.gov.uk/CEC/CityDevelopment/TransportandTravel/Parking/GreenwaysandBusLanes/GreenwaysAndBusLanes.html>
6. Brown, Angie (19 July 2005). Chaos for 300,000 passengers as bus strike threatens economy. Scotsman.
7. See <http://www.transdev.fr/cgi-bin/index.asp?l=ENG>
8. See McEwen, Alan (25 July 2005). Trams won't harm the city's wildlife, say transport chiefs. Scotsman.
9. See Edwards, Gareth (28 June 2005). Trams plan boost as objectors fall in line over safety worries. Edinburgh Evening News.
10. In the 1999 census, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyon>
11. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyon>
12. Lit: 'districts'.
13. Interview with Gilles Godard, SYTRAL, 13/7/05
14. Interviews with Gilles Godard, SYTRAL, 13/7/05 and Vincent Gascon, Semaly, 1/7/05.
15. Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance; The Scottish Executive (September 2003).
16. See Figure A which highlights the high level of satisfaction with public transport in Lyon in comparison with Edinburgh shown by the questionnaire.
17. Semaly Consultancy was formed in 1968 to spearhead implementation of the underground métro system. After initial negotiations with the central French government for finance to build a subway system in the late 1960s, the application was turned down. In Scotland the lack of funding from central government would, in the majority of cases, prevent development of a major public transport system. But Greater Lyon Council, working with the Département du Rhône, effectively defied the State government and established a publicly owned engineering company which Giles Godard described as being "*created by the local governments in opposition to the state government*". Semaly has since been privatised (in 1990), but remains the dominant engineering consultancy in the Greater Lyon area.

8. REFERENCES

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